This paragraph seems to have some implicit assumption that may not hold true in CS. 

When you do security analysis, you have to assume that the tool is detectable.
Detectability does not prevent from making tools that aim at indistinguishability of user queries or clicks. In other words, detection of the tool is not the end but the rule of the game with all the challenges that come along with it.

If you want to pollute databases, then you want indistinguishability of the users with an obfuscation tool from those who don't have it. This mean the tool should ideally not be detectable which is in conflict with the goal of ad naseum wanting to express protest. This is a choice you make but it inevitably effects your goals. Which is something you can expand on the last sentence of the first paragraph:
"However, detectability is not the only avenue for expression, nor is an adversary the only audience." 
With respect to this last sentence, could you please do the following:
Could you put a pointer to Section III.A where you discuss the impact of detectability or say a few words about it here. 
The reviewers would also like you to expand on that last sentence e.g., are you saying that blocking is also a form of protest but ad nauseam has prioritized the explicit signalling.